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RECENT CASES
INTERNATIONAL LAW-UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 301 IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING
IN THE ABSENCE OF IMPLEMENTATING EXECUTIVE
OR LEGISLATIVE ACTION-Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d
848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
On October 4, 1971, Secretary of State William P. Rodgers
informed the United Nations General Assembly' that the
United States had decided to accept the recent advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in
Namibia (formerly Southwest Africa).' Shortly thereafter, on
October 20, 1971, the Security Council, with the affirmative
vote of the United States, adopted Resolution 301 in which it
called upon
[A]ll states .

.

. to abstain from sending diplomatic or

special missions to South Africa that includes the Territory of Namibia3 in their jurisdiction .

.

. [And] to ab-

stain from entering into economic and other forms of relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over
the Territory.'
By operation of the United Nations Charter, the United States
5
is to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19721 is designed
to protect and encourage the development of marine mammal
resources. To achieve this goal, the Act imposes a general mor1.

26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1), 1, U.N. Doc. A/PV 1950 (1971).

2. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia, [1971] I.C.J. 16.
3. Namibia, formerly known as Southwest Africa, was a German colony administered after World War I by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate. In 1948,
South Africa announced the end of the mandate and has since treated Namibia as its
own territory and exploited both the natural resources and the population.
4. 26 U.N. SCOR (1598th mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/27, at 7-8 (1971). Security
Council Resolution 301 reaffirmed earlier U.N. Security Council resolutions calling on
member states to refrain from dealings with South Africa which were inconsistent with
the declared illegality of the South African control of Namibia. See Security Council
Resolution 283, 25 U.N. SCOR (1550th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25, at 2-3 (1970);
Security Council Resolution 276, 25 U.N. SCOR (1529th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25,
at 1-2 (1970).
5. See U.N. CHAE art. 25.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1975).
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atorium on the importation of marine mammals and marine
mammal products; however, the Act authorizes the Secretary
of Commerce to waive the moratorium if certain requirements
regarding the harvesting of the mammals in the country of
origin are met.7 On two occasions, October 25, 1973, and November 19, 1973, the Fouke Company applied for a waiver pursuant to that clause. After review by the Commerce Department, which included an official trip to South Africa and Na.mibia, the two applications were consolidated and denied.
Shortly thereafter, Fouke once again applied for a waiver to
import skins from the 1975 South African harvest.'
Since ruling on the new application would involve an official trip to Namibia, in violation of Resolution 301, an action
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking an injunction to prevent any such contact
with South Africa. The plaintiffs were: Charles Diggs, Jr.,
Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Africa; George
Houser, Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa; Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), an
association of inhabitants of Namibia and persons who have
come from Namibia; and Theo-Ben Gurirab, a member of
SWAPO and its unrecognized "representative plenipotentiary
to the United Nations and to the Americas," who cannot return
to Namibia since he would be subject to arrest by the South
African government. The case was brought as part of a continuing effort to secure the enforcement of the United States' international obligations, especially those relating to human rights,
through the courts.
The defendant was Elliot L. Richardson who, as Secretary
of Commerce, was responsible for the implementation of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act. Fouke intervened in the action. Together, they filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Although the district court found that the plaintiffs
had sufficient standing to bring the suit, it granted the motion
on the grounds that Resolution 301 was not self-executing and
therefore created no private rights or, alternatively, that the
matter was within the foreign policy authority of the President
and was therefore non-justiciable.'
7. Id. § 1371(a)(3)(A).
8. See 40 Fed. Reg. 2852 (1975).
9. Diggs v. Dent, No. 74-1292 (D.D.C., filed May 14, 1975), aff'd
sub non. Diggs
v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that Resolution 301
constituted a binding international obligation of the United
States'0 and further that it was self-executing. The government
countered by maintaining that the plaintiffs lacked standing;
that Diggs v. Schultz," a decision of the same court which recognized standing in almost parallel circumstances," was
wrongly decided; and that the approach used in that case had
3
been undercut by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.'
Additionally, it was asserted that the suit raised issues of a
political nature which were not appropriate for adjudication.
Finally, the government argued, that United Nations Security
Council resolutions cannot create legally binding obligations
and are never self-executing.
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the court of
appeals reasoned that the resolution in question did not confer
rights upon citizens of the United States that are enforceable
in court in the absence of implementing legislation. In reaching
its decision, the court focused on the issue of whether United
Nations Security Council resolutions were self-executing. It
placed primary reliance on People of Saipan v. United States
Department of Interior'4 which involved a determination of
whether or not the provisions of the United Nations Charter
concerning the Trusteeship Agreement were self-executing. To
10. Plaintiffs cited a letter dated August 2, 1974 from Deputy Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll to Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent, in which Ingersoll
states:
We do not believe that an official visit to Namibia by Commerce Department employees or contract personnel, and a possible determination by
you regarding South Africa's management of Namibian marine mammal
resources can be brought into conformity with . . . the obligations [set
forth in Security Council Resolution 301].
A subsequent letter from Ingersoll to the Secretary of Commerce, Rogers B. Morton,
stated:
We believe that U.S. Government approval of an application to import
Namibian fur seal skins from South Africa would be contrary to our
international legal obligations in that it would necessarily recognize the
validity of South African management of Namibian resources.
11. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
12. In Diggs, plaintiffs who had been denied admission to Rhodesia sued to
enforce executive orders implementing an economic embargo declared by the U.N.
Security Council. Although the court there recognized the plaintiff's standing to sue,
it denied relief on the ground that a subsequent act of Congress (the Byrd amendment)
had abrogated whatever obligation may have existed.
13. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
14. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
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determine this, the People of Saipan court looked first to the
intention of the parties as manifested in the language of the
instrument and second, to the circumstances surrounding its
creation. Since these two primary criteria were not helpful on
the issue, it then looked to several contextual factors, including: 1) the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators; 2) the existence of domestic procedures and institutions
appropriate for direct implementation; 3) the availability and
feasibility of alternative enforcement methods; and 4) the
immediate and long-range social consequences of self-or nonself-execution. 15
Without providing an extensive analysis of how People of
Saipan applied to the particular facts of the case or the language of the resolution, the court in Diggs v. Richardson
concluded that Resolution 301 was not self-executing. The
court observed that the language of 301 was directed at government action rather than at the action of private citizens and
therefore the issue was related to foreign policy, "an area traditionally left to executive discretion."'"
In light of the motivating forces behind this litigation and
its relation to the growing international concern for human
rights (Frank C. Newman, noted international human rights
advocate, submitted an amicus curiae brief), the significance
of Diggs seems to go beyond the question of standing or of selfexecution. Therefore, the court's decision may be as important
for what it did not do as for what it did.
Specifically, the right of standing established in Diggs v.
Schultz, recognized in People of Saipan, and challenged here
was inferentially reaffirmed. The case was decided on the related, "but analytically distinct [grounds] of selfexecution,"' 7 thus leaving intact the ability of individuals to
bring actions seeking enforcement of United States' international obligations. This is especially significant in view of the
recent narrowing of the concept of standing by the United
States Supreme Court.

8

While the court appeared to give a deferential bow to the
weight of authority on the question of self-execution, a close
reading of the case supplemented by an examination of the
15. Id. at 97.
16.
17.
18.

Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id. at 850.
See cases cited note 13 supra.
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relevant supporting documents hints that the decision was,
rather, a suggestion that the administrative departments resolve the dispute among themselves. The correspondence produced by the plaintiffs clearly showed that in traveling to
Namibia, the Commerce Department knowingly went against
an express State Department position. 9 The application of the
Fouke Company which gave rise to the suit was still pending
when this decision was rendered,20 thus the court's decision can
be read as a reluctance to interpose a judicial remedy, especially a precedent-breaking one, where an administrative one
would suffice.
Scott Lord
19.
20.

See note 10 supra.
Fouke's application was subsequently denied.

DUE PROCESS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-STATUTE PROHIBITING UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF MID-WIFERY
DOES NOT VIOLATE A WOMAN'S RIGHT OF
PRIVACY-Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556
P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976).
Three women from Santa Cruz, California, were charged
with violation of section 2141 of the California Business and
Professions Code, which prohibits the unlicensed practice of,
among other things, midwifery.' The People's complaint
charged that from October 25, 1973, to March 6, 1974, the
plaintiffs
did willfully and unlawfully hold [themselves] out as
practicing a system of treating the sick or afflicted to wit:
such practices as undertaking to assist and treat a woman
in childbirth as authorized in sections 2137 and 2140 of the
Business and Professions Code, and treat for a physical
condition of a person, to wit: Terry Johnson, by such practices without having at the time of doing so a valid unrevoked certificate as provided in Chapter V, Division 2 of
the Business and Professions Code.'
The women, as defendants in municipal court criminal
proceedings, demurred to the complaint. The court overruled
the demurrer and the women, for the first time as plaintiffs,
sought a writ of mandate from the superior court, directing the
sustention of their demurrer.
In the wake of the superior court's refusal to issue the writ,
the women appealed asserting that the complaint was so
worded as to charge a violation of only the first part of section
2141, which prohibits holding oneself out as treating the "sick
3 Thus, they
or afflicted.",
contended that childbirth was neither
a sickness nor an affliction and therefore, the portion of the
complaint equating midwifery with the treatment of the sick
or afflicted failed to state a cause of action.' Additionally, they
argued that the second part of section 2141, which prohibits the
unlicensed diagnosis and treatment of a "physical condition,"
was not meant to include the practice of midwifery. 5
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2141 (West 1974) (current version at CAL. Bus. &
§ 2350 (West Supp. 1977)).
2. Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 484-85, 556 P.2d 1081, 1082-83,
134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 631-32 (1976).
3. Id. at 485, 556 P.2d at 1083, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
4. Id. at 487, 556 P.2d at 1084, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
5. Id. at 490-91, 556 P.2d at 1086, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
PROF. CODE
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The women further asserted that the section was unconstitutionally vague because it could reasonably be interpreted to
prohibit even innocent behavior, such as a friend's informal
advice on how to treat a common cold.' Moreover, they claimed
that it was overly broad since it proscribed treatment of nondiseased as well as diseased conditions, and thereby infringed
upon both the free speech of unlicensed persons who desired to
give advice as well as the right to privacy of prospective patients.! Finally, they contended that, should the court construe
the statute to prohibit unlicensed midwifery, the statute would
violate a mother's right of privacy which encompasses the right8
to choose whom she wants to assist in the delivery of her child.
In rejecting the women's attacks on both the statute and
the California Supreme Court provided much
complaint,
the
needed insight into the scope of the "Healing Arts" portion of
the California Business and Professions Code. The court disposed of the preliminary issues involving the wording of the
complaint by relying on Penal Code section 952, which provides
that an accusatory pleading "may be in the words of the enactment describing the offense .

. . ."

The court ruled that lan-

guage of the complaint paralleled the language in both portions
of the statute so as to give the women sufficient °notice that they
were being charged with violating both parts.
The court next turned to whether the practice of unlicensed midwifery constituted a violation of section 2141 as
treatment of the "sick or afflicted." It reasoned that it did not
on the basis of former section 2140, which defined midwifery
as assistance in normal childbirth, and on the general rule of
due process, that when statutory language is susceptible to two
reasonable constructions, the defendant is entitled to the one
most favorable to him." However, the court found that the
complaint stated a cause of action based on its reference to
Business and Professions Code section 2137, which prescribes
certain acts that can be performed only by a licensed physician.'" This reference, in effect, charged the women with pur6. Id. at 491, 556 P.2d at 1087, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
7. Id. at 493, 556 P.2d at 1088, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
8. Id. at 494, 556 P.2d at 1088-89, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 637-38.
9. Id. at 486, 556 P.2d at 1083, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 952 (West 1970)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 488, 556 P.2d at 1084, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
12. Id. at 488, 556 P.2d at 1085, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (applying CAL.Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2137 (West 1974)).
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porting to treat complications of childbirth which, the court
concluded, "unquestionably do qualify as 'sickness' or
'afflications.' "3
In order to determine whether or not the second part of the
statute prohibited the unlicensed practice of midwifery, the
court looked to the broad meaning of "physical condition," to
prior appellate court decisions, and especially to accepted rules
of statutory construction described in prior case law. In accordance with those rules, the court referred to the entire statutory
scheme of which section 2141 is a part in order to determine its
meaning. The court reasoned that, since the statutory sections
set out licensing provisions of various medical practices, including midwifery, their intent is to provide a sanction
against uncertified persons who perform acts authorized under
the various certificates described in the statutory scheme.
The exclusion of uncertificated midwives, the court stated,
would render the midwife certificate under section 2140 virtually meaningless. Therefore, the court refused to construe the
statute such as to make other existing provisions ineffective. 4
Having construed the statute to prohibit unlicensed midwifery, the court was ready to rebut the allegation that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague. It employed the rationale that a statute is not void for vagueness merely because
marginal cases raise doubt as to its application, so long as an
accused can reasonably understand that his or her act is prohibited by the terms of the statute. 5 Under this rationale, the
critical question was whether the women's alleged acts fell
plainly within the proscription of the statute.
The court reasoned that since the statute is included
within the division entitled, "Healing Arts," the legislature
intended it to apply to persons who provide certain medical
services which constitute the healing arts. The court found
midwifery, based on its inclusion in the statutory scheme, was
one of the healing arts, and therefore, its unlicensed practice
fell within the proscription of the statute. In addition, the court
reasoned that midwifery involved medical expertise, thus
bringing the women's alleged acts clearly within the statute's
regulatory scope."
13.
14.
15.
National
16.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Dairy
Id. at

488-89, 556 P.2d at 1085-86, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
492, 556 P.2d at 1087, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (quoting United States v.
Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963)).
493-94, 556 P.2d at 1087-88, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37.
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Proceeding to the contention that the statute was overly
broad because it could be interpreted to infringe upon protected rights, the court noted that key verbs in the statute limit
its coverage to one who "diagnoses, treats, operates for, or prescribes" without a valid certificate. Consequently, it reasoned
that the verbs sufficiently narrowed the statute's coverage to
the intended purpose of the entire statutory scheme.'7 In addition, the court recognized the legitimate state interests in protecting citizens from unqualified practitioners in the medical
field.
Applying the rationale that a statute which restricts constitutionally protected conduct may nevertheless be valid if it
also serves important societal interests, the court concluded
that section 2141 adequately served an important state interest
in health and medical safety standards and was therefore
valid.'" In effect, the court found a rational nexus between the
statute and the legitimate state interests. The establishment of
a rational nexus follows the traditional standard of review
which requires that a state's regulatory system be shown to
have a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 9
The court's recognition of important state interests aided
its analysis of the privacy issue. Relying heavily on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,20 the court
recognized that a woman has a constitutional right to privacy
which extends to the right to terminate her pregnancy, but
noted that this right has never been so broadly interpreted as
to protect a woman's right to choose the manner and circumstance in which her baby is born. The court was unwilling in
this instance to extend the right of privacy to cover the acts of
the midwife.
Moreover, as in Roe, it recognized the important state interests in the health and safety of both mother and child which
justify limitations on the exercise of the privacy right. The
court concluded that the policy reasons that permit a state to
prohibit abortion of a viable fetus, may also support a state's
requirement that those who assist in childbirth have valid li2
censes. '
17.

Id. at 494, 556 P.2d at 1088, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (quoting

CAL.

Bus. & PROF.

CODE § 2141 (West 1974)).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 493-94, 556 P.2d at 1088, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
410 U.S. 151 (1972).
18 Cal. 3d at 495, 556 P.2d at 1089, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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The court's decision in Bowland v. Municipal Court underscores the validity and importance of state interests in the
health and safety of those who rely on medical practitioners for
treatment. In deference to those interests, the court placed
midwifery securely within the regulatory bounds of section
2141. It thereby restricted the practice to those with certificates
and, at the same time, encouraged reliance on certificated midwives by women who might choose their services.
The highlight of the decision was the court's affirmance of
the validity of the statute in light of the alleged violation of a
woman's right of privacy. The court resolved the issue by refusing to expand the right to include a woman's liberty to choose
whom she wants to assist in the birth of her child. The decision
not only reflects the nebulous nature of the privacy right, but
also the extent to which it is restricted, or even superseded, by
legitimate state interests. At the same time, the court's reliance on cases to determine exactly what constitutes the right
of privacy strongly suggests that it is limited to certain personal
choices pertaining to child rearing, marriage, procreation, and
abortion, and that outside those specific areas, privacy ceases
to be a protected right.22
Arlene Ichien
22.

Id. at 494, 556 P.2d at 1089, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 638.

WARRANTLESS ARREST-CITIZEN'S DECISION TO
ARREST INITIATES ARREST PROCESS AND VALIDATES INCIDENTAL POLICE ACTION-Green v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 68 Cal. App. 3d 536, 137 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1977).
While driving in the city of Covina at one in the morning,
Michael Baughn observed a car being driven in an unlawful
and erratic manner. He saw the car wander back and forth
across the street, run a red light, hit and straddle a center
divider and travel north in a southbound lane. Thinking the
driver might accidentally kill someone, Baughn followed the
car until it pulled into a private driveway and stopped. Upon
approaching the car, he discovered that the driver appeared to
be either asleep or insensible. Baughn located a police officer
to whom he related the traffic offenses, described the car, furnished its license number and the address where the car had
parked. Baughn then drove home while two alcohol safety officers were dispatched to investigate the car and its driver.
When the officers arrived, they discovered Imogene Green
asleep in the driver's seat. The officers shook Green awake and
she exited the car exhibiting obvious symptoms of intoxication.
Since the officers could not arrest Green for any traffic offenses
they had not witnessed, they picked up Baughn at his residence
and brought him to the detention scene. Baughn identified
Green as the driver of the car he had previously observed and
stated that he wanted to have her arrested.
After Green refused the field sobriety test, the officers instructed Baughn on the procedures for a citizen's arrest outlined in Penal Code section 837.' Baughn subsequently placed
Green under arrest. The officers then informed her that she was
under arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor,' and that she was subject to loss of her license for refusal
to take the sobriety test.'
Following these events, the Department of Motor Vehicles
CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (West 1970) provides in relevant part:
A private person may arrest another:
1.

1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102(a) (West 1971).
3. The implied consent admonition provides that every driver is deemed to have
consented to a chemical test for alcoholic content if lawfully arrested for an offense
while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. If any such person refuses to
submit to a chemical test, the Department of Motor Vehicles must suspend that
person's license for a period of six months. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West 1971).
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suspended Green's driver's license for refusal to submit to a
chemical test for intoxication and she brought an action of
administrative mandate to compel the Department to reinstate
it.
In support of her claim for reinstatement, Green alleged
that the arrest was invalid under any of three basic rationales.
First, she maintained that if the arrest was made by the police
officers under Penal Code section 836,1 which authorizes warrantless arrest based on probable cause to believe that an offense was committed in the officer's presence, none of the three
officers present at the arrest had witnessed the offense of driving while intoxicated.
Second, she argued that if the arrest was by Baughn under
Penal Code section 837, which authorizes a citizen's warrantless arrest, the "fresh pursuit rule" required that the arrest be
effected in fresh pursuit of the offender or within a reasonable
time after the offense was committed. Under the circumstances
of the arrest Green reasoned this rule had not been satisfied.
Finally, she contended that if the arrest was by Baughn, it was
invalid as Baughn had no actual knowledge that she was intoxicated.
The trial court granted the writ of mandate and the Department of Motor Vehicles appealed on the grounds that the
arrest was valid either as a citizen's or a police arrest. The court
of appeal found that the citizen's arrest was valid on the undisputed facts and reversed with directions to deny the issuance
of the requested writ.
In making its determination, the appellate court initially
examined the facts surrounding Baughn's actions. The court
pointed out that when Baughn first notified the police, he had
actual knowledge that Green had committed multiple offenses,
including possibly reckless driving. When Baughn later returned to the detention scene, the court noted that he acquired
actual knowledge that respondent was intoxicated. Thus, the
court concluded that Baughn's arrest of Green for driving
under the influence was not invalid for lack of actual knowledge of intoxication.
Turning to the claim that the arrest was invalid for lack
of fresh pursuit, the court actively praised the citizen for taking
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:
A peace officer may . . . without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a public offense in his presence.
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considerable time and trouble to aid in protecting the public
from Green's reckless conduct. The court had little difficulty
finding the fresh pursuit rule satisfied; the citizen did not go
about other business before deciding to have Green arrested,
rather, he promptly notified police and, when they were prevented from making the arrest, came at once and effected the
arrest personally. Only thirty to forty minutes had elapsed between the time Baughn left the scene and the actual arrest.'
The Green court did not directly answer the question as to
whether the officers did or could initiate a warrantless arrest.
Rather, the decision rested on the assumption that a citizen's
arrest was made. The court justified the actions of the police
in investigating Green's condition on the grounds that at that
time, there was ample probable cause to detain her.7 Further,
the court found that the citizen's arrest procedure began when
Baughn first decided to arrest Green and actively sought help
from the police. Thus, "the arrest" covered a period of thirty
to forty minutes during which the citizen was absent for a
substantial period of time. In addition, when Baughn summoned the police, the officers, in effect, became his agents for
purposes of the arrest.' Because of this expansive definition of
the arrest, and the fact that the police were Baughn's agents,
the police conduct, which included the attempted administration of a field sobriety test, was viewed as incidental to
Baughn's valid citizen's arrest.
Green v. Department of Motor Vehicles clearly broadens
the time frame of a citizen's arrest by finding that the arrest
begins when the citizen first makes the decision to arrest and
takes action in that regard. Additionally, by characterizing the
police as agents of the private citizen, the decision avoids the
problem of state action. Active police participation in the effecting of a citizen's arrest may now be deemed incidental if it
can be shown that the decision to arrest began with the private
citizen. Under this rationale, even police conduct which is ini5. Green v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 68 Cal. App. 3d 536, 541, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 371 (1977).

6. The court distinguished Jackson v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 219
P.2d 879 (1950). In Jackson, the police waited 28 hours before attempting a warrantless
arrest of a child for shooting a BB gun at a public building.
7. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 372. It is a well recognized rule that
an officer may stop a motorist or pedestrian for questioning under circumstances that
fall short of probable cause for arrest. See, e.g., Cornforth v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 3 Cal. App. 3d 550, 552, 83 Cal. Rptr. 762, 764 (1970).
8. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
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tially questionable apparently can be ratified; arguably paving
the way for a host of new situations in which a warrantless
arrest can be effected. Though the Green reasoning appears
inoffensive when applied to a traffic offense, it could be applied
in other areas to further erode the warrant requirement.
Kenneth Fairbanks Gray

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-BLOOD PRODUCT- DISTRIBUTION BY A PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY DEEMED
A SERVICE, AND NOT SUBJECT TO STRICT LIABILITY
IN TORT OR WARRANTY-Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories,68
Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977).
In November of 1971, James Fogo was admitted to a Kansas hospital, suffering from viral hepatitis, contracted from a
Factor IX coagulant (Konyne) manufactured and distributed
by Cutter Laboratories. The patient, a mild hemophiliac, had
been treated with Konyne by his physician prior to a tooth
extraction. The coagulant stopped the bleeding within two
hours, but two months later Fogo died of viral hepatitis.
Fogo's surviving wife and children brought a wrongful
death action against Cutter in California upon five causes of
action: negligence, strict liability, express and implied warranty, and willful and malicious conduct.' The trial court refused the wife's instructions on strict liability, and express and
implied warranty, and the jury failed to find Cutter negligent'
in its manufacture of the product, Konyne.3
In affirming the trial court's rejection of the strict liability
and warranty causes of action, the appellate court focused on
the language of Health and Safety Code section 1606. Section
1606 provides that the procurement, processing, distribution,
or use of any blood product or blood derivative-such as Konyne-is a service "for all purposes whatsoever."' At issue, was
whether the language of 1606 should be extended to include the
commercial distributor of a blood product.5 Specifically, the
1. Kansas law imposes a $50,000 limitation on the recovery of wrongful death
damages; there is no limitation on such damages in California. In addition to actual
damages, the wife and children sought punitive damages on the willful and malicious
cause of action. Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 760, 137 Cal. Rptr.
417, 425 (1977).
2. The negligence cause was predicated upon both a failure to adequately warn
of the inherent risks involved in using the coagulant and upon the alleged negligent
use of blood collected at plasmapheresis centers located in slum areas. Id. at 757, 763,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 423, 426-27.
3. Evidence submitted by Cutter Laboratories indicated that Konyne is a
plasma-derived coagulant. There is no known scientific method for detecting the hepatitis virus in the plasma. Although there are methods for destroying the virus, the
technique cannot be used in processing Factor IX without simultaneously destroying
the coagulating activity of the factor.
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1970).
5. See Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Blood Bank, Inc., 62 Cal. App.
3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1976) (blood transfusion provided by a for-profit blood bank
is a service covered by 1606); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606,
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court was forced to consider whether Cutter's marketing of
Konyne for profit was a sale, possibly subjecting Cutter to
strict or warranty liability, or a service within the meaning of
1606, exempt by definition from such liability.
After noting that Cutter marketed the blood product in
order to profit therefrom, the court reasoned that this did not
necessarily give rise to a sale. On the contrary, the court found,
without elaborate analysis, that "the clear language of section
1606 requires us to construe the respondent's distribution of
Konyne as the rendition of a service.
...
"I The court then
concluded that this characterization of the distribution scheme
as a service precluded the application of strict liability. The
court found itself "constrained to adhere to the time-honored,
well-established law which states that those who sell their services . . . cannot be made liable in the absence of negligence or
intentional misconduct." 7
Similarly, the court quickly disposed of the warranty
causes of action-without a sale there is no cause of action in
warranty.' The court added, however, that had there been an
issue on express warranty, the extensive warranty printed on
the package would have provided a valid disclaimer on any
warranty cause of action.' Finally, the court indicated that
even if express warranty liability was to be extended to service
transactions, reliance on the warranty must be shown as an
incident to recovery. Since there was no evidence that the
treating physician had relied upon Cutter's warranty in his
administration of Konyne, the court reasoned that this also
defeated the express warranty cause of action. 10
Fogo remains consistent with previous California decisions, which thus far have been unwilling to expand the theory
of strict liability in tort from sales transactions to sales of services. Additionally, Fogo extends this unwillingness to liability
in express warranty.
Nevertheless, the Fogo rationale probably does not repre109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973) (blood transfusion provided by a private hospital is a service
covered by 1606).

6. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 755, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
7. Id. at 756, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (quoting Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 613-14, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1973)).
8. Id. at 762, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
9. Id. at 758, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 425. The warranty provided in part that: "we do
not warrant either a good effect or against an ill effect following its use. The foregoing
warranty is exclusive and in lieu of all other warranties." Id.
10. Id. at 763, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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sent a bar to the expansion of strict liability or express warranty theory to the area of services." The Fogo decision is
grounded upon a statute which labels what is arguably a sale,
a service.
The statute expresses a strong public policy in support of
the efficacy of blood transfusions and blood products, and Fogo
indicates a firm refusal to apply no-fault liability to those products which the courts deem covered by section 1606. Moreover,
the Fogo court ostensibly could have reached a similar conclusion, had the distribution of Konyne been found to be a
sale-by characterizing Konyne as one of the unavoidably unsafe products described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'"
The Fogo court found that the impossibility of testing for the
hepatitis virus, and the manifest desirability of encouraging
drug companies to continue to develop such products, 3 militated against the application of strict liability theory to products such as Konyne. 4
BarbaraFrischholz
11. See, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1973); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 9 Cal. Rptr.
187 (1971).
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965).
13. Cutter Laboratories was awarded the 1969 Research and Achievement Award
from the National Hemophiliac Foundation for its development of the first Factor IX
concentrate. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
14. Id. at 752-53, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 422.

STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY-SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS ARE STRICTLY LIABLE IN TORT FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED BY ITS PREDECESSOR CORPORATION-Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22,
560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
Herbert Ray, claiming damages sustained from a fall from
a defective ladder, sued Alad Corporation (Alad II) in strict
liability. Alad II had neither manufactured nor sold the ladder,
but had, prior to the accident, succeeded to the business of the
actual manufacturer (Alad I) through the purchase of that corporation's assets for an adequate cash consideration.' The trial
court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Ray subsequently appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The issue confronting the supreme court was whether it
should create a special exception to the general rule against the
imposition upon a successor corporation of its predecessor's
liabilities when the plaintiff has no viable remedy against the
actual manufacturer of a defective product.
Other than those contractual liabilities expressly assumed,
the acquisition of a manufacturing business generally does not
impose the liabilities of the predecessor upon the successor.
The criteria that courts have traditionally used when determining whether a purchasing corporation should assume a seller's
liabilities are whether:
(1)there is an express or implied agreement of assumption,
(2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger
of the two corporations, (3) the purchasing corporation is
a mere continuation of the seller, or (4) the transfer of
assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of
escaping liability for the seller's debts ...
Ray conceded that Alad II had entered no express or implied agreement to assume its predecessor's liabilities and that
Alad II had no fraudulent purpose in not making this assumption. Additionally, the supreme court found that the consideration paid was adequate and was made available to Alad I's
1. Included in the acquisition were the manufacturing plant, offices, office fixtures and equipment, trade name, inventory, and good will of the actual manufacturer

of the ladder. Alad II continued to manufacture the same product line under the Alad
trade name, and solicited Alad I's customers through the same sales representatives,
with no outward indication of the change in ownership.
2. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 560 P.2d 3, 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579
(1977).
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creditors at the time of the dissolution and sale. Despite the
adquacy of the consideration, Ray contended that Alad II was
a mere continuation of Alad I, in view of Alad II's acquisition
of Alad I's assets and its use of those assets and former employees to continue the manufacture of the same product line.
In response to this argument, the supreme court observed
that a sucessor corporation is considered a mere continuation
of its predecessor when: "(1) no adequate consideration was
given for the predecessor corporation's assets and made available for meeting the claims of its unsecured creditors, or (2) one
or more persons were officers, directors, or stockholders of both
corporations." 3 Finding neither of those conditions present, the
court concluded that Alad II was not a mere continuation of
Alad I. Thus, the court found that under the general rule governing succession to a predecessor corporation's liabilities,
Alad II would not be liable to Ray.
However, the court went beyond the traditional rule and
continued its inquiry. It noted that Ray had no viable remedy
against the actual manufacturer because of its dissolution and
subsequent distribution of assets to its shareholders. Further,
the court noted that Alad II had acquired the technical ability
to estimate the risk of claims arising from the previously manufactured ladders.4 Significantly, the court also recognized the
fairness of requiring the successor corporation to assume responsibility for defective products manufactured by its predecessor. It reasoned that this responsibility was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's goodwill being
enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the
predecessor's business. Thus, the court concluded that a party
who acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of products assumes strict liability in tort for
defects in similar units previously manufactured and distributed by the acquired entity.5
In Ray v. Alad Corp. the California Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its promotion of the policy of strict liability in tort
and the spreading throughout society of the costs of injuries
due to defective products.6 The court has extended the rule of
strict liability to successor corporations who have acquired the
3. Id. at 29, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
4. Id. at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
5. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
6. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963) (seminal case announcing California's policy on strict liability in tort).
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assets, trade name and goodwill of a legally dissolved manufacturing business and have continued producing the predecessor's line of products, one of which has caused personal injury.
Based on the narrowness of the court's holding, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Alad analysis would not extend to
those situations in which merely the trade name is continued
but the product line is not. However, precisely how many of the
operating assets of the predecessor's business must be acquired
to give rise to liability is not clear from the court's opinion.7
The impact of Alad will be felt primarily in two areas.
First, Alad expands the remedies available to those individuals
injured by defective products. Second, and more importantly,
the decision will affect the buying and selling of corporate assets where the buyer contemplates continuing production of
the predecessor's line of products. Successor corporations will
have to contemplate strict liability in tort for the predecessor's
defective products when negotiating the purchase price.
Steven W. Valdes
7. One element of the Alad case not addressed by the supreme court was that of
the age of the defective ladder in question. According to the court of appeal, the ladder
was probably manufactured in 1952, making it seventeen years old at the time of Ray's
injury. Ray v. Alad Corp, 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818 (1976), vacated,
19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). One might legitimately inquire as
to how long a manufacturer should be required to warrant his product. It seems that
there should be a point where natural wear and tear takes over. See Balido v. Improved
Mach. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973) (defense of age or obsolesence).

DEPOSITIONS-ABSENT A STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES, VIDEOTAPE MAY NOT BE USED TO RECORD
AND REPORT PROCEEDINGS AT A DEPOSITION-Bailey v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 970, 568 P.2d 394,
140 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1977).
While operating a radial arm saw, designed and constructed by Sears, Roebuck, and Company, Paul Sherod Bailey
severely injured his right hand. Bailey sued Sears, alleging that
its negligent design and construction of the saw proximately
caused his injury.
After filing its answer, Sears submitted written interrogatories to Bailey requesting a description of the accident. Viewing the responses as inadequate, Sears filed a motion in the
trial court for an oral deposition as provided for in Code of Civil
Procedure section 2019. The motion also requested a special
order directing Bailey to record a reenactment of the accident
on videotape. The trial court granted the motion for the videotape reenactment and ordered it included as part of the deposition.
Bailey petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of prohibition to restrain the order for videotaping. The appellate court
affirmed the order, and Bailey subsequently sought a similar
writ from the California Supreme Court. The question before
the court was: "Absent a stipulation of the parties, may videotape be used to record and report the proceedings at a
deposition?"' The court held that it may not.
Basing his argument on Code of Civil Procedure sections
17,2 2004,1 2019(c),' and 2019(e), 5 Bailey asserted that, absent
a stipulation of the parties, only a written reproduction of deposition testimony was permitted.
In support of its motion, Sears offered three arguments on
the acceptability of videotaping. Initially it suggested that the
supreme court adopt the reasoning of a New Jersey appellate
1. Bailey v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 970, 973, 568 P.2d 394, 395, 140 Cal. Rptr.
669, 670 (1977).
2. A "writing" is defined as including "printing and typewriting." CAL. Civ.
PRoc. CODE § 17 (West 1970).

3. A deposition is defined as a "written declaration, under oath." Id. § 2004.
4. At a deposition "[t]he testimony shall be taken stenographically and transcribed unless the parties agree otherwise." Id. § 2019(c).
5. The original of the deposition shall be provided to the deponent for "reading,
correcting, and signing." Id. § 2019(e).
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court, which had approved of videotaping as a proper method
of recording.
Alternatively, Sears maintained that the provisions of the
Evidence Code controlled the question of whether or not videotaping was an acceptable means of recording. Since videotaping was included within the code's definition of a writing, Sears
contended it could be used to record deposition testimony.7
Finally, Sears argued that the court should simply approve
videotaping as a proper method of recording depositions. In
this regard, it noted that both the California Rules of Court'
and the Evidence Code9 recognize videotaping as a superior
method of recording testimony.
While acknowledging that the Code of Civil Procedure did
not expressly prohibit videotape recording, the supreme court
reasoned that the legislative intent was clear: depositions were
to be recorded and transcribed into a writing, unless the parties
agreed otherwise. This conclusion was supported by commentators, 0 Voorheis v. Hawthorne-Michels Co.," and United
States Steel Corp. v. United States.12
Addressing Sears' contentions, the court noted that the
6. See Blumberg v. Dornbusch, 139 N.J. Super. 433, 354 A.2d 351 (1976).
7. 19 Cal. 3d at 976, 568 P.2d at 397, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
8. CAL. R. CT. 980(c) provides: "A court may permit photographing or electronic
recording of judicial proceedings for the perpetuation of the record."
. 9. CAL. EvID. CODE § 250 (West 1970) defines "writing" as "handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of recording
upon any tangible thing any form of communication or representation ....
"
10. See, e.g., Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 17-18
(1972); Salomon, The Use of Videotape Depositions in Complex Litigation,51 CAL. ST.
B. J. 20, 72 (1976).
11. 151 Cal. App. 2d 688, 312 P.2d 51 (1957).
12. 43 F.R.D. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The court looked to both Voorheis and United States Steel Corp. in its attempt
to determine the legislative intent of Code of Civil Procedure section 2019. In Voorheis
the deponent made statements under oath but died before he had an opportunity to
read and sign the transcript. The court would not allow the deposition into evidence
because it had not been properly authenticated. The Voorheis dictim stated: "The
term 'deposition' is now confined in meaning to testimony delivered in writing." 151
Cal. App. 2d at 692, 312 P.2d at 54.
In United States Steel Corp. the court construed rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (at that time worded identically to Code of Civil Procedure section
2019(c)) to preclude videotaping of a deposition, even to supplement the stenographic
record.
In Bailey, the supreme court stressed that the legislature did not respond to the
dicta of Voorheis and did not expand the definition in the Evidence Code in 1965. The
retention of the 1903 Code of Civil Procedure definition implied that the legislature
intended that depositions should continue to be recorded in the traditional manner.
19 Cal. 3d at 974-75 n.5, 568 P.2d at 396-97 n.5, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72 n.5.
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company's reliance on New Jersey case authority was misplaced for two reasons. First, the court found that the significant disparity in the language of the two statutes weakened the
applicability of the New Jersey court's reasoning.' 3 Second, the
court noted that an out-of-state decision interpreting a procedural rule of that state was of little assistance to a California
court attempting to determine the intent of the California legislature."
Turning to Sears' argument that the Evidence Code was
controlling, the court rejected it, again for two basic reasons.
First, it noted that the Evidence Code did not attempt to control the recording and reporting of depositions, but simply their
admissability at trial. Second, it pointed out that the Evidence
Code, by its very terms, dictates that its provisions are inapplicable when "otherwise provided by statute."" Consequently,
since the Code of Civil Procedure, which regulates the reporting and recording of depositions, provides its own definition of
a "writing," the court concluded there was no reason to rely on
the definition of a writing found in the Evidence Code."
In dismissing Sears' contention that videotaping should be
approved due to its superiority, the court matter-of-factly
noted that the reliability and advantages of videotape were not
at issue. The issue was whether or not the legislature had intended that videotaping be used to record and report depositions. The court deemed unimportant the fact that the legislature had authorized the use of videotape in contexts other than
depositions.' 7
In closing, the Bailey court was careful to emphasize that
its decision did not depart from the philosophy of liberal construction of discovery statutes in favor of disclosure. It seems
clear from the language of the opinion that the decision does
not deal with the scope of discovery but merely with the methods of recording and reporting depositions.
The Bailey court was equally careful to confine its decision
to the sole issue of whether one party may compel the other to
submit to the videotaping of a deposition. The court expressly
limited the possible extension of its reasoning by stating that
it did not reach five related questions. These questions in13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

19 Cal. 3d at 975, 568 P.2d at 397, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
Id. at 975-76, 568 P.2d at 397, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
See CAL. EvID. CODE § 250 (West 1966).
19 Cal. 3d at 976, 568 P.2d at 397, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 672-73.
Id. at 977-78, 568 P.2d at 398, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74.
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cluded: May the parties agree to supplement a written transcript with a videotape? Can the parties forego a written transcript in favor of a videotape? Would depositions be more available to indigents if audiotape was held to be an acceptable
substitute for a stenographic record? Does the supreme court
have the inherent forma pauperis power to waive the requirement of a stenographic record? and, Is the requirement of a
stenographic record an unconstitutional denial of due process
and equal protection unless trial courts are permitted to waive
this requirement for indigent persons?' 8
In Bailey, the California Supreme Court wisely refrained
from extending the method of recording and reporting depositions. Before videotaping becomes an accepted practice, rules
must be promulgated to determine how the events in question
should be depicted. The needed guidelines will have to include
standards controlling the qualifications of videotape technicians, types of tape, cameras and microphones, the number
and placement of cameras and microphones, and the method
of reviewing, correcting, and certifying videotapes. Similarly,
these standards should indicate whether a videotape must be
supplemented by a stenographic record.
This list of problems, no doubt incomplete, amply demonstrates that the propriety of videotaping is a question better
handled through the legislative process than by case-by-case
determination of the courts.
Robert Zager
18.

Id. at 978 n.12, 568 P.2d at 399 n.12, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 679 n.12.

